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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, worldwide financial losses to business software piracy were
estimated at $12 billion.1 Although worldwide piracy rates dropped between
1994 and 1999, possibly due to increased availability of legal software and
increased government cooperation in enforcing penalties,2 business software
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2002, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
1. BusINEss SOFrWARE ALLIANCE, 1999 GLOBAL SoPTwARE PIRACY REPORT - A STUDY
CONDUCTED BY THE INTERNATIONALPLANNING AND RESEARCH CORPORATION IORTIHE BusINESS SOFTWARE
ALLIANCE AND SOFTWARE& INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 8 (2000) (presenting a table of financial
losses to piracy by country, region, and world from 1994 through 1999). All financial information in this
Comment is presented in United States dollars.
2. Id. at4.
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piracy remains a pressing issue in Asia.3 While North America and Western
Europe, at 30% each, accounted for the largest percentages of money lost to
business software piracy in 1999, Asia and Pacific Rim countries followed
close behind at 23%."
As China seeks accession to the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
"WTO"), its software anti-piracy enforcement efforts will be scrutinized and
may be found lacking. If China accedes to the WTO, it will be required to
comply with the WTO' s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) standards for intellectual property protection. United
States non-governmental organizations (hereinafter "NGOs"), such as the
Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IPA), are willing to help China reduce its rate of software piracy.
These organizations have experience working in the United States and other
countries to educate software users, encourage software piracy reporting, assist
law enforcement agencies, gather market information, and recommend software
anti-piracy strategies to businesses and governments. However, China's
political, legal, and social structures present special challenges to these NGOs.
This Note will first discuss transnational software trade in China with an
emphasis on United States concerns over the piracy of its software products.
Second, it will examine China's current software anti-piracy initiatives. Third,
it will outline TRIPS requirements and discuss how China's current software
anti-piracy initiatives fall short of TRIPS's standards. Fourth, this Comment
will introduce two NGOs, the IIPA and the BSA, explain their software anti-
piracy capabilities, and examine their current activities in China. Finally, it will
identify problems NGOs may encounter as they seek to help China comply with
TRIPS and make recommendations for future NGO software anti-piracy
activities in China.
II. TRANSNATIONAL SOFTWARE TRADE IN CHINA
Software is a booming business in countries across the globe, and China
is no exception. A November 1998 study reports that China's software industry
is growing by 28% per year and projects a total economic impact of $6.2 billion
by 200 . As the software industry grows, so grow its associated problems. In
3. I
4. Id
5. PRicEwAmRhiOUSECOOPsPs, CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE
ECONOMY - A SwtDY CONDUCTED BY PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, COMMISSIONED BY THE BUSINESS
SOFTWARE ALIANCE I (1998) [hereinafter CONTMIMBtON OF TiE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE
ECONOMY).
a recent worldwide study, China, with a 91% rate of software piracy,6 was
second only to Vietnam (at 98%) in its utilization of pirated business software.'
Business software piracy8 takes several forms: downloading software from the
Internet, making multiple copies of a program when a license has been bought
for only one user, creating or copying compact disc read-only memory
(hereinafter "CD-ROMs"), or loading software without license onto new
computers before sale.9 Because pirates can instantly redistribute their spoils
worldwide via the Internet, and because purchasers of pilfered software have
an attractive choice of media, software piracy is not merely a local problem but
a national and transnational concern.
For China, national protection of intellectual property'0 is both an internal
and an external issue: first, China must protect its own software developers'
work from piracy by others (a problem beyond the scope of this Comment), and
second, China must protect the intellectual property of its transnational trading
partners. With a WTO membership on the horizon, China is focused on the
second tier of the problem: reassuring the international community of its
concern for other nations' intellectual property, including software copyrights.
H-istorically, China's failure to provide adequate copyright protection"' to
other nations' software products discouraged transnational software trade,
especially with the United States. The United States Trade Representative's
Office (USTR) has for years kept China on its watch list," although in the wake
6. "Rate of software piracy" refers to the percentage of software applications in use that were not
purchased at retail, but pirated (copied) from a private source and redistributed through various means
without license from the original author. BUSINESS SOFTWARE AujANCE, CONTRmUTIONS OF THE
PACKAGED SOFrwARE INDUSTRY TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13-14 (1999) [hereinafter CONTRutmoNs OF
THE PACKAGED SOFrWARE INDUSTRY].
7. lId at 13.
8. "Software Piracy is the use or reproduction of a software product without the express consent
of its author." Id.
9. Id.
10. "Intellectual property, very broadly, means the legal rights which result from intellectual activity
in the industrial, scientific, literary, and artistic fields." IDnELLECUAL PROPERTY READING MATEAL, at
3, WIPO Pub. No. 476(e), available at http://www.wipo. org/about-ip/en/ (last visited July 30, 2000).
Software protection is a facet of intellectual property protection. Ia
11. The question, "what is software?" has spawned interesting debates: is it mathematical
expression, a written work, or an electronic pattern? Is it mere command, or expression? Is it tangible or
intangible, and what sort of legal tool can best deter its unauthorized use? Should it be patented, copyrighted,
or trademarked? For an introductory discussion in the context of copyright law, see Rafael A. Declet, Jr.,
Protecting American Intellectual Property in China: The Persistent Problem of Software Piracy, 10 N.Y.
INT'L L REV. 57, 70-71 (1997). See also Karl F. Jorda, Software Protection: Copyrights, Patents, Trade
Secrets and/or sui generis, 4 ELSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 337, 337 (1998) (advocating sui generis protection
for software).
12. "Countries listed on the [USTR's] Priority Watch List, Watch List, and Special Mention list
are subject to increased bilateral scrutiny but are not subject to immediate trade sanctions ... Priority
2000] Miller
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of recent trade agreements the USTR demoted China from a high-scrutiny
status13 to one of continued monitoring. 4 The United States voted in May 2000
to grant permanent normal trade relations (hereinafter "PNTR") status to
China. 5 This optimistic development, however, pales in comparison to China's
piracy-related trade losses, which were measured in 1998 at $808.4 million for
commercial software applications alone. 6
Over the last twenty years, China has tried to become the friendliest child
on the transnational software trading playground. Recent trade agreements
ostensibly reflect deep concern for protecting other nations' intellectual
property. During trade negotiations with the United States between 1980 and
1995, China designed new copyright laws as a concession to the United States'
concern over intellectual property protection. 7 The Sino-German Accord
signed this summer emphasized intellectual property protection and "technol-
ogy cooperation.""' A May 2000 trade agreement with the European Union
Foreign Countries under Special 301 become subject, after 30 days, to a Section 301 action... [emphasis
sic]." Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, USTR Again Names China as a Priority
Foreign Country Under Special 301 (Apr. 30, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter USTR Again Names
China as a Priority Foreign Country].
13. "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the principal United States statute for addressing
foreign unfair practices affecting United States' exports of goods or services. Section 301 may be used to
enforce United States rights under international trade agreements ...." Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Monitoring and Enforcing Trade Laws and Agreements (2000) (on file with author).
The WTO has held that Section 301 activities are in compliance with WTO member guidelines. Press
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, WTO Adopts Panel Findings Upholding Section 301 (Jan.
27, 2000) (on file with author).
14. The USTR ended its Special 301 investigation of China in February 1995 when the United
States and China entered into a bilateral trade agreement. The investigation had been initiated in May 1994.
USTR Again Names China as a Priority Foreign Country, supra note 12. As of May 1, 2000, and at the time
of this writing, the USTR is monitoring China at the "Section 306" level, which "monitors how countries are
complying with their agreements with the U.S. - to ensure that the countries are implementing the reforms
to which they have committed themselves." Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA
Lauds USTR's Continuing Pressure On Countries To Improve Copyright Protection and Enforcement
Through the Special 301 and TRIPS Processes (May 1, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter UPA Lauds
USTR's Continuing Pressure].
15. See, e.g., US House Passes Bill on China's PNTR Status, CHINA DAILY (May 25, 2000),
available at httpJ/www.chinadaily.comcn/highlightstwto/reaction/pntr.525.html.
16. INTERNATIONAL INTELILECAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ALI.ANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT PEOPLE'S REPUBuC OF CHINA 27 (2000) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL INTEuEcruAL PROPERTY AuIANCE 2000 SPEcIAL. 301 REPORT] (presenting a table of
financial losses to software piracy from 1994 through 1999).
17. See, e.g., Kenyon S. Jenckes, Note, Protection of Foreign Copyrights in China: The
Intellectual Property Courts andAlternative Avenues of Protection, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 551,
557 (1997) (discussing highlights of the 1995 Intellectual Property Agreement between the United States and
China).
18. Agence France Presse, Chinese Prime Minister Wins German Assurances on Taiwan, Opens
Rule of Law Dialogue, INSIDE CHINA TODAY, July 2, 2000.
emphasized access and ownership in mobile telecommunication markets. 9
China has also made international treaty commitments to intellectual property
protection. In 1980, China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization
(hereinafter "WIPO"),2 ° an agency of the United Nations system.21 In 1985,
China became a member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property,' which provides for reciprocal intellectual property protection among
the states of its Union.23 In 1992, China became a party to the Berne Conven-
tion, which establishes copyright protection guidelines for its member
24countries.
China has, at least on paper, backed its international commitments with
national action. It has launched internal software anti-piracy initiatives
designed to reduce the rate of software piracy in China. These initiatives will
form the backbone of China's TRIPS compliance strategy should China accede
to the WTO.
M. CHINA'S SOFTWARE ANTI-PIRACY INITIATIVES
China's internal anti-piracy initiatives include creating laws against
software piracy, establishing courts to deal with intellectual property rights
violations, and establishing government offices to coordinate law enforcement.
First, as a result of United States trade pressure and China's desire for
WTO membership, China has made significant changes in the "substantive
aspect of copyright enforcement in China," i.e. its copyright laws." Copyright
laws are held by "international consensus" to be an appropriate, albeit not ideal,
means of software protection.' The United States has been a driving force in
19. BBC News Online, EU-China Agree Trade Deal, available at http'/news6.thdo.
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/businesstnewsid%5F755000/755139.stm (last modified May 19, 2000).
20. World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties ofTreatiesAdministeredby the
WIPO - Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, at http'//www.wipo.int/
eng/ratifilc/doc/e-berne.doc (last visited July 30, 2000).
21. World Intellectual Property Organization, What is WIPO, available at http'//www. wipo.org
/eng/newindex/about.htm (last visited July 31, 2000).
22. World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by the
WIPO -Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, at http://www. wipo.int/eng/ratific/doc/d-
paris.doc (last visited July 30, 2000).
23. World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, available at http://www.wipo.org/engiplex/wo-parO-.htm (last visited July 26, 2000).
24. Gregory S. Feder, Note, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: You Can Lead
a Horse to Water, But You Can't Make It Drink, 37 Vat. J. INT'LL 223,226-27 (1996) (citing generally the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Lteray and Artistic Works).
25. Julia Cheng, Note, China's Copyright System: Rising To The Spirit of TRIPS Requires An
Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1941, 2006 (1998).
26. See Jorda, supra note 11, at 337 (noting an "international consensus" in favor of copyright
protection for software, but advocating sui generis protection).
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China's copyright law development, successfully urging through trade pressure
that China enact "modem" intellectual property legislation. Second, China
has created an intellectual property court system. The intellectual property
courts, which have been in place since 1993, were specifically created to deal
with copyright, patent, and trademark litigation.29 Finally, China has created
government offices and agencies to enforce software anti-piracy measures. The
IIPA reports that in 1999, two government offices emerged as leaders in
China's fight to enforce its copyright laws.3 China's State Intellectual Property
Office (hereinafter "SIPO") was established in 1998 to monitor and centralize
intellectual property protection enforcement.3 China has also created the
Office of National Antipiracy and Pornography (hereinafter "NAPP"), which
the IIPA reports has "assumed control over coordinating all copyright
enforcement throughout China."32
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF TRIPS
China's desire for WTO membership33 is viewed as the solution to its
ongoing software piracy problem. The prevailing attitude is that China would
not dare endanger its quest for WTO-member status, or its status if achieved.'
If it accedes to the WTO, China will be obligated to comply 5 with the
27. Assafa Endeshaw, Commentary, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. LJ. So. & TECH. 295,312-13 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Declet, supra note 11, at 70.
29. See Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the People's
Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INrL ECON.
L 415,436-37 (1996).
30. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note.
16, at 30.
31. OFFCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIvE, 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 50 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT].
32. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at30.
33. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,33 LLM. 1125,1150-51
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. Although a signatory to the WTO Agreement, China is not yet a member of
the WrO. Article XI II of the WTO Agreement only incorporates the European Communities nations and
nations that were signatories to the 1947 GATr. Md China, not in either of these classes, must comply with
a Schedule of Specific Commitments. If it complies, it will be designated an original WTO member. Id.
34. 'The financial promise of WTO membership and the tremendous volume of Chinese exports
to the United States have become too important to the future of the Chinese economy for Beijing to risk the
consequences of non-compliance." Jenckes, supra note 17, at 571. Declet agrees, saying WTO membership
is the "long-term solution" to China's software piracy problem. See Declet, supra note 11, at 76.
35. Some WTO member obligations, including TRIPS obligations, were scheduled for
implementation over a period of time beginning April 14, 1994 (the date of the Uruguay Round's Final Act).
Countries acceding to the WTO after April 14,1994 must also meet these obligations. Further, the standards
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intellectual property protection standards set out in the WTO's Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights."'
On its face, TRIPS does not overburden China. TRIPS allows members
to implement existing laws in pursuit of TRIPS-defined objectives, and it does
not require members to create special legal channels for intellectual property
enforcement.3" The substance of the Berne Convention, of which China is
already a member, serves as the basis for TRIPS guidelines," and the Berne
Convention requirements are incorporated into the current WTO standards for
intellectual property protection.39
However, TRIPS is more than a legislative drafting checklist. TRIPS also
provides for compliance monitoring, identifies information that WTO members
are required to disclose upon request, sets forth guidelines for enforcing TRIPS,
and creates a body charged with overseeing member compliance.' These
provisions are the ones that might cause trouble for a WTO-member China,
because they do more than set legal standards. They require actual deterrence
of intellectual property infringement and disclosure of results to the WTO.
First, TRIPS specifies that members "provide for" criminal penalties,
fines, and imprisonment that will deter "willful... copyright piracy on a
commercial scale."' TRIPS specifically states that "remedies available shall
include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent [to
piracy and counterfeiting]."' 2 Although TRIPS does not set forth any standard
or formula for measuring whether a nation is providing sufficient deterrents,
this language certainly implies that TRIPS is outcome-based. Common sense
applicable to existing WTO members will be applied equally to the new country when it accedes, i.e., a
latecomer to the WTO must, at the time of its accession, compare favorably to countries that have been
working on their implementations for years. See WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at 1151.
36. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is Annex I c
to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which is embodied in the Uruguay Round
GATT concluded in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.
37. "Mhis Part does not create any obligation to put in place ajudicial system for the enforcement
of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the
capacity of Members to enforce their law in general." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 LLM. 1125, 1214
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
38. Cheng, supra note 25, at 1946.
39. World Intellectual Property Organization, International Protection of Copyright and
Neighboring Rights, at http://www.wipo.int/eng/general/copyrght/bern.htm (last visited July 31, 2000). The
WIPO's online information about the Berne Convention notes that all members of the WTO are also bound
to the terms of the Convention, with some exceptions for parties that are not signatories to the Convention.
40. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 37, at 1213-20 (setting out general member
obligations to enforce TRIPS).
41. Id. at 1220.
42. Id.
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indicates that the "sufficiency" of a penalty could vary from nation to nation,
so the most simple way to determine whether piracy is reduced is an empirical
one: find a way to measure a nation's rate of software piracy and monitor the
nation for a decline in that rate. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that WTO
members are expected to comply with TRIPS by finding ways to reduce their
measurable rates of software piracy.
Second, TRIPS created The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter "Council for TRIPS"), which reports
to the General Council of the WTO.43 The Council for TRIPS monitors TRIPS
member compliance and works in cooperation with WIPO to carry out duties
assigned to it by TRIPS members." TRIPS charges the Council for TRIPS with
reporting and evaluating TRIPS-related complaints. 5
Finally, TRIPS requires WTO members to publicize TRIPS-related laws,
judicial decisions, government administrative rulings, and agreements among
domestic government agencies to their fellow members.' It also specifically
requires members to provide their legislative, judicial, and administrative
information to the Council for TRIPS upon request. 7 Presumably these
provisions not only encourage transparent cooperation among member
countries, but also allow the Council for TRIPS to evaluate whether each
member country is complying with its TRIPS obligations.
Disputes arising under TRIPS" are governed by the GATT.49  The
GATT' s dispute resolution procedures provide for three levels of response to
a complaint against a member: first, to "secure the withdrawal of the measures"
that conflict with a WTO member agreement; second, to provide compensation
to a member claiming injury,' and finally, "as a last resort," to suspend
"concessions or obligations . . . on a discriminatory basis" in favor of the
complaining member.5" In plain language, trade sanctions may be authorized
against a WTO member that fails to comply with TRIPS provisions.
At first glance, China appears to be ready for WTO membership.
Technically, TRIPS requires only that member countries have "enforcement
43. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at 1146 (creating the Council for TRIPS and
defining its reporting relationship to the General Council of the WTO).
44. TRIPS Agreement. supra note 37, at 1223.
45. Id. at 1221.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Presumably, such disputes include allegations of member failures to comply with TRIPS
guidelines; TRIPS makes no other specific provision for penalizing member non-compliance.
49. The TRIPS Agreement refers the reader to "Articles XXII and XXIII of GAIT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the [accompanying) Dispute Settlement Understanding." TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 37, at 1223.
50. Compensation is an interim remedy until the offending measure may be withdrawn. ld at 1227.
51. Id
procedures... available" to protect intellectual property and to "constitute a
deterrent to further infringements. 52 China's laws, courts, and government
offices ostensibly meet this requirement. However, TRIPS also requires that
WTO members effect measurable drops in their rates of software piracy. Thus,
China's TRIPS compliance troubles will arise not from a dearth of laws, but
from an apparent inability to apply them.
V. CHINA'S ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
If China is obligated to comply with TRIPS's standards for intellectual
property protection, it will have to improve its legislation and its law enforce-
ment. China's legislative drafting efforts, its law enforcement systems, and its
government agencies have all been criticized for failing to meet the latest
international standards.
First, China's existing laws and proposed amendments have garnered
criticism. Arguably, China's existing laws do not adequately protect other
nations' intellectual property rights.53 The IIPA notes that even the latest
revisions to Chinese legislation, while possibly TRIPS-compliant as drafted,
will probably not meet TRIPS requirements as applied.' The USTR agrees,
noting in a discussion of China's 1999 trade law reforms, "the vague wording
of many Chinese laws and regulations often leads to conflicts with other laws
or broader trade and investment policies, and makes compliance difficult."55
Also, as one commentator succinctly observes, merely establishing copyright
laws does not "automatically lead to their enforcement."'
China's present law enforcement is also inadequate. China's intellectual
property courts report only spotty success in resolving copyright infringement
cases. The court system has been criticized for inadequately training its judges
and allowing itself to be used as a tool of the Communist Party.57 Chinese
courts have also been accused of slow claims handling time and a burdensome
requirement that the complaining party produce evidence before a court will
decide whether to hear a case.5" One writer observes that it is "not a cost-
52. Id at 1213-14.
53. For additional discussion of whether China's existing copyright laws adequately protect
software, see Declet, supra note 11, at 70.
54. International Intellectual Property Alliance, People's Republic of China, at
http://www.iipa.com/htmilrbc-china-301-99.html (last modified Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter People's
Republic of China] (providing excerpts from the EPA's 1999 Special 301 Recommendations to the USTR).
55. 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 42.
56. Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 314.
57. Declet, supra note 11, at 71-72.
58. Jenckes, supra note 17, at 556.
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effective investment" to bring suit in China.59 Although China has created
government offices and departments to execute its new intellectual property
protection policies, the international community and the United States are
suspicious about whether these departments are able to, or wish to, perform
their intended tasks. The USTR observes that, "[w]hile [establishing SIPO] is
a positive step, SIPO has yet to establish that it can manage its responsibilities
effectively."' In 2000, the United States Department of State reported that
"[a]lthough China has revised its laws to provide criminal penalties for
intellectual property violations, the United States remains concerned that
penalties imposed by Chinese courts do not act as a deterrent."'6 ' The IlPA
concurred, reporting that "actions by [government agencies] are too sporadic
and the administrative fines are simply too low to deter piracy."'62
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
In short, China's efforts do not appear to impress the United States or the
international community as a whole. Even in the wake of this summer's trade
accords that anticipate WTO backing from trading partners,63 China is being
asked to tighten its existing intellectual property protection practices. In a
March 2000 report, the United States Department of State affirms that it intends
to continue Section 306' monitoring to ensure that China is complying with its
651oexisting United States trade agreements. In July of 2000, European Union
officials called for better cooperation between China's government and law
enforcement branches, presenting China with a list of 400 Chinese companies
suspected of infringing on European Union member software copyrights.'
Though trading partners disapprove of China's status quo, China does not
seem to be getting the international help it needs to correct its anti-piracy
59. Id. at 569. Although Jenckes is discussing difficulties encountered by American businesses,
the expense of proceeding in a Chinese court may be reasonably inferred to apply to other international
plaintiffs.
60. 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 50.
61. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRs, U.S. DEPARTmENToF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY
REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES - CHINA sec. 8 (2000) [hereinafter 1999 COUNTRY
REPORT].
62. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLANcE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 31.
63. Agence France Presse, EU Calls on China to Reign In Rampant Copyright Theft, INSIDECHINA
TODAY, July 26, 2000, at http://www.insidechina.cominvestorinsightbusiness.php3?id=I 82651 (last visited
July 26, 2000) [hereinafter EU Calls On China]. See also Agence France Presse, supra note 18; EU-China
Agree Trade Deal, supra note 19.
64. Section 306 is a trade status of continued monitoring. See HPA LAUDs USTR'S CONTINUING
PRESSURE, supra note 14.
65. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at sec. 8.
66. EU Calls on China, supra note 63.
enforcement problems. In its 1995 trade agreement with China, the United
States made only vague promises of "technical assistance." '67 Although the
European Union signed an intellectual property enforcement assistance
agreement with China and opened a patent office in Beijing last year,6" it still
claimed that Chinese companies were infringing on its copyrights.
Nor is the WIPO providing focused assistance to China. Article 4(1) of
the 1995 agreement between the WIPO and the WTO promises that "[t]he WTO
Secretariat shall make available to Member States of the WIPO which are
developing countries and are not WTO Members the same technical coopera-
tion relating to the TRIPS Agreement as it makes available to developing
country WTO Members."69 However, China is not identified by the WIPO as
a Least Developed Country (hereinafter "LDC"), and therefore presumably not
a candidate for the specialized WIPO anti-piracy enforcement programs
referenced in Article 4(1).70
VII. THE POSSE COMES TO TOWN: UNITED STATES
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Given China's existing anti-piracy enforcement problems, other nations'
failure to actively help China solve those problems, and China's ineligibility for
the WIPO's LDC assistance, China will have to seek other allies in its war on
software piracy if it accedes to the WTO. NGOs, experienced in anti-piracy
lobbying and enforcement, can help China comply with the provisions of
TRIPS. Two NGOs have taken a dedicated interest in China: the International
Intellectual Property Alliance and the Business Software Alliance.
A. The International Intellectual Property Alliance
Formed in 1984, the IPA is an umbrella organization for seven private
trade associations, "each representing a significant segment of the United States
copyright community."'" The EPA works worldwide with governments and
67. Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 328. Endeshaw also notes that the United States made no
"substantial concessions" to China in this agreement, and that it is unclear whether the agreement is designed
to assist China or merely protect the United States trade interests. Id.
68. Eubusiness, EU- China Intellectual Property Rights Cooperation Programme, at http:J/www.
eubusiness.com/cgi-binitem.cgiid--9951&d=101&dateformat=%o-%B (last modified June 30, 1999).
69. Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 LLM. 754, 758 art. 4 (1996).
70. See generally World Intellectual Property Organization, Establishment of the Least Developed
Countries Unit, at http:J/www.wipo.org/eng/ldc/index.htm (last modified July 30, 2000) (identifying Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) and outlining WIPO's intent to help the governments and industries in these
countries create and maintain intellectual property protection systems).
71. International Intellectual Property Alliance, International Intellectual Property Alliance 1, at
Miller2000]
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private industries to deter copyright infringement in music recording and
publishing, written publishing, computer software, computer gaming, videos,
and motion pictures.72 In the United States, the IIPA reports to House and
Senate subcommittees on member activities in China.73 The IIPA also makes
recommendations to the USTR during the USTR's annual Super 301 trade
review process and generates reports for the USTR's Special 301 trade
review.74 Internationally, the IIPA participated in TRIPS development for the
WTO.75 The BIPA is also a non-governmental organization participating in
WIPO,76 and it participates in "regional initiatives," notably the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation."' The IPA actively monitors China's software piracy
problem, and in February 2000 it wrote in support of United States congressio-
nal approval for permanent normal trade relations between the United States
and China.7"
While the IIPA gathers information, participates in international
discussion, and reports on activities in China, one of its member organizations,
the BSA, works at the local level in China to effect change.
B. The Business Software Alliance
The BSA, a member of IIPA,79 is a software industry trade organization
with ten "worldwide members," all of which are software companies incorpo-
rated or headquartered in the United States.' The BSA Policy Council includes
http:/www.iipa.com/FACLSHEET.PDF (last modified Aug. 2000) [hereinafter International Intellectual
Property Alliance].
72. Id. at 2-3.
73. See, e.g., Press Release, International Intellectual Property Alliance, IIPA Reports to Joint
Senate-House Hearing That China Fails to Comply with the 1995 IPR Agreement (Mar. 7, 1996).
74. See, e.g., USTR AGAIN NAMES CHINA AS A PRIORIrY FOREIGN COUNTRY, supra note 12.
75. International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 71, at 1.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. International Intellectual Property Alliance, An Open Letter In Support of China PNTR From
America's Creative Industries, available at http://www.iipa.com/2000_CHINA_PNTR. PDF (last modified
Feb. 23, 2000).
79. International Intellectual Property Alliance, supra note 71, at 2.
80. Business Software Alliance, Business Software Alliance, at http://www.bsa.org/
tour/members/index.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Business Software Alliance). The BSA's
membership list, provided in the BSA's online brochure, lists the following companies as "worldwide
members": Adobe Systems, Inc. (www.adobe.com); Autodesk, Inc. (www.autodesk.com); Bentley Systems,
Inc. (www.bentley.com); Corel (www.corel.com); Lotus Development Corporation (www.lotus.com);
Microsoft Corporation (www.microsoft.com); Network Associates (www.nai.com); Novell, Inc.
(www.novell.com); Symantec Corporation (www.symantec.com); and Visio (www.visio.com). The investor
relations and legal information on each of these companies' websites reveals that, although many have
transnational presence and trasnational business partners, all of them are United States-based corporations
or business entities and/or traded on United States stock exchanges.
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all ten worldwide members, plus seven additional members, all of which are
also incorporated or headquartered in the United States."'
Like the IPA, the BSA participates in domestic and transnational policy
discussions. It encourages legislative software protection efforts by promulgat-
ing its Cyber Champion awards in the United States. 2 Recently, United States
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky received the award for her efforts
to promote intellectual property protection agendas in China-United States trade
matters.83 BSA representatives testify before United States legislative bodies,8 '
and in 1999 the BSA spent over $1 million on domestic lobbying activities."
The BSA was also active in WIPO's treaty organization 6 and maintains an
ongoing presence in WIPO's regional initiatives.87
The BSA exists to stop software piracy. It employs a variety of tactics in
the United States and in other countries to encourage piracy reporting and to
enforce software anti-piracy laws. In the United States, the BSA brings suit
against private companies and even government offices.88 One source reports
that "the [BSA] investigates an average of 500 cases a year [in the United
States] and has collected more than $10 million in penalties." 9
On its website, www.bsa.org, the BSA provides reading material,
educational material, and downloadable freeware9' to help United States
81. The seven Policy Council members who are not also BSA "worldwide members" are Attachmate
(www.attachmate.com); Apple Computer (www.apple.com); Compaq Computer Corporation (www.compaq.
com); IBM Corporation (www.ibm.com); Intel Corporation (www.intel.com); Intuit Corporation (www.intuit.
corn); and Sybase, Inc. (www.sybase.com). Business Software Alliance, supra note 80.
82. Bryan Rund, Legal Business - Honors and Appointments, LEGAL TIMES, November 15,1999,
at 25.
83. Id. Although Rund does not specifically cite the Special 301 review process, the BSA publicly
endorsed Barshefsky's decision to place China and other countries on the USTR Priority Watch and Watch
lists. See Press Release, BusINEss SOFWAREALLANCE, STATeMENTFROM BSAPREsIDENT&CEO ROBERT
HouEYMANSUPPORINGUSTR'SEMPHASISoNTRPSCOMPuANCEIN ANNUAL SPECIAL 301 DESIGNATION
ANNOUNCEMENT (May 1, 2000) (on file with author).
84. See, e.g., Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Leading Software Industry ExpertTestifies
Before Congress (June 29, 2000) (on file with author).
85. Center for Responsive Government, 1998 Data - Business Software Alliance, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/98profiles/3593.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2000).
86. Brenda Sandburg, High Tech Takes Center Stage In Washington, THE RECORDER (San
Francisco), Sept. 11, 1998, at 1.
87. World Intellectual Property Organization, Governing Bodies of WIPO and the Unions
Administered by WIPO 34, athttp://www.wipo.int/engtdocument/govbody/wo_.gb-ab/pdf/ab3l5.pdf(last
modified Aug. 29, 1997).
88. News, J. RECORD, July 3, 1997, available at 1997 WL 14394866.
89. Software Piracy Probe Nets Florida Firms, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 27, 2000, at 3.
90. 'Treeware," often distributed over the Internet, does not require users to pay a license fee to the
developer as long as the freeware is used in the manner specified by the developer.
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companies track software licenses and conduct internal licensing audits.9' The
BSA also provides transnational Internet resources. Its websites offer corporate
educational materials and model corporate policies for the United States and
United Kingdom.92 Further, the BSA maintains a worldwide network of
websites in member countries' native languages, offering e-mail piracy
reporting forms, toll-free telephone numbers for software piracy reporting
hotlines, and links to online BSA reports and resources."
The BSA does not confine itself to the virtual world; it also works directly
with law enforcement agencies worldwide to conduct undercover sting
operations and raids on commercial software piracy operations. In 1997, BSA
member Microsoft and the BSA conducted 51 raids on software pirates in
Singapore, resulting in several jail sentences.' In 1998, the BSA filed over 750
lawsuits in Latin America on behalf of Microsoft." In 1999, the BSA reported
successful coordination with the Danish National Computer Crime Unit to
break a European software counterfeiting ring.'
The BSA's current activities in China include filing lawsuits, conducting
government and industry cooperative programs, and monitoring China's
software market and piracy activity. In 1995, the BSA announced its first in-
court legal victory when a Chinese court found in favor of BSA members
Autodesk, Microsoft, and Novell against China's Juren Computer Company.
The court held that Juren had illegally distributed BSA members' software.'
As part of the 1995 United States-China trade agreement, the BSA was allowed
to establish offices in China to help implement a "title verification system" that
identifies original compact disc and laser disc products.9" The BSA also works
with the provincial offices of China's official Administration for Industry and
Commerce (hereinafter "AIC'),' and this work has given rise to software
licensing audits by the AIC and a letter-writing campaign to educate corporate
91. Business Software Alliance, BSA Freeware, at http'//www.bsa.org/freewaret (last visited Aug.
7, 2000).
92. Id.
93. Business Software Alliance, supra note 80.
94. U.S. Help Is Sought In Fight In Singapore Against Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998,
at All.
95. Jim Oliphant, Booty and the Counterfeiting Beast - Microsoft Has Set Up a Unique Unit of
Undercover Operatives and Specially Trained Investigators in Fort Lauderdale Devoted to Thwarting
Software Piracy in South Florida and Latin America, PALM BEACH DAiLY Bus. REv., Oct. 1, 1999, at 12.
96. Wendy Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 16, 1999, at 5 col. 1.
97. U.S. Software Makers Win Copyright Ruling in China, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1995, at B3.
98. Jenckes, supra note 17, at 556, (1995 testimony of Ambassador Michael Kantor and Eric Smith,
IIPA President, before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade).
99. People's Republic of China, supra note 54.
end-users about software piracy."° In addition, the BSA offers computer
hardware and technical assistance to Chinese law enforcement agencies.' °"
The BSA also coordinates efforts with the private sector.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, working for the BSA, recently conducted a study of
100 Chinese software-related companies to evaluate the Chinese software
industry."°2 In June of 2000, the BSA signed an agreement with Hong Kong
Internet service provider Asia Online to crack down on software piracy via the
Internet.'03 Finally, the BSA monitors China and strives to increase its presence
and promote its image there. Although the BSA only reports two affiliated
companies in Asia, " it publicly supports Chinese anti-piracy initiatives through
its Internet outlets.'0 5 In 1999, the BSA openly announced that it "stands ready"
to support the Chinese government in software anti-piracy efforts.'06
VIII. CAN NGOs FILL CHINA'S ENFORCEMENT GAPS?
United States non-governmental organizations are present and active in
China, but if China accedes to the WTO, it will need to correct its software anti-
piracy enforcement problems to comply with the outcome-based TRIPS
provisions. At that point, NGO presence will only be relevant if those NGOs
are helping China comply with TRIPS.
China will have to fight on multiple fronts to comply with TRIPS. It must
improve its laws, effectively promulgate them, and consistently enforce them.
It must also show meaningful cooperation among its governmental branches and
private industries. It must reduce its measurable rate of software piracy enough
to convince the WTO that it is creating the intellectual property infringement
deterrents TRIPS requires. The international community, as a whole, has not
offered much internal law enforcement help to China. NGOs are equipped to
100. Id
101. International Inteilectual Property Aliance, China, athttp:/www.iipa.com/htl/ bcchina301
_98.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2000) [hereinafter China] (containing excerpts from the International
Intellectual Property Association's 1998 Special 301 Recommendations issued on Feb. 23, 1998).
102. See CONThXtIrON OFTHE SOFWARE INDUSTRY TOTHE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 5, at
20.
103. Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Asia Online Joins BSA in Fight Against Software
Theft Amid Growing Threat of Internet-Based Piracy (June 12, 2000) (on file with author).
104. Business Software Alliance, About BSA, at httpJ/www.bsa.org/hongkong/about/(last modified
1998).
105. The BSA maintains a special website for its activities in the "Asia Region" at
http:/www.bsa.orglasiapr/ and another for Hong Kong at http://www.bsa.orghongkong/.
106. Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Chinese Government Issues Decree Requiring All
Government Entities to Clean Up Internal Software Piracy (Apr. 7, 1999) (on file with author). This 1999
decree expressed China's commitment to enforcing its 1995 official directive that Chinese government offices
use only legal software.
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fill some of these anti-piracy law enforcement gaps, but all NGO activity will
rely on China's cooperation in deed as well as in word.
A. Drafting Laws
China's 1990 "two-tiered" copyright laws are inadequate because they
provide more protection to other nations' intellectual property than they provide
for Chinese intellectual property.0 7 TRIPS requires that each member provide
to other nations a level of protection no less favorable than the protection the
country provides to its own people.'0 8 The UPA believes that TRIPS requires
equal protection for nationals and non-nationals; it was allowed to review
proposed amendments to the "two-tiered" laws in 1999.'09 It reported that the
amendments were still inadequate, and that as of 2000 the Chinese government
neither enacted the amendments nor provided a progress report to the IIPA."0
NGOs can help with legislative drafting. As discussed above, both the
HPA and the BSA have experience lobbying in, reporting to, and testifying
before the United States government, governments in other countries, and the
WIPO. WIPO and the Council for TRIPS already have a formal cooperative
relationship,"' and the IUPA is a WIPO participant. Therefore, the IlPA has
access to the latest international trends in intellectual property enforcement and
could provide specific information to help Chinese legislators tighten the gaps
between existing law and TRIPS-compliant law." 2
NGOs must note, however, that a Chinese commitment to drafting new
laws does not guarantee that those laws-are appropriate for the problems and the
people affected by them. " The legislative drafting urged by the United States
during trade negotiations and the values that NGOs bring to China's
policymaking efforts may be in fundamental conflict with the social and legal
structures formed by China's communist and imperial history. The political
developments that led to China's current copyright laws reflect a blend of
107. See People's Republic of China, supra note 54 (noting that China's latest laws provide more
protection for "foreign rightholders" than for Chinese software developers).
108. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 37, at 1198-99.
109. People's Republic of China, supra note 54.
110. INTERNATONAL bmauEmL PROPERTY AIUANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 34.
111. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 37, at 1223.
112. See, e.g., People's Republic of China, supra note 54. The section entitled "New Draft
Copyright Law" contains a point-by-point UPA analysis of potential TRIPS and Berne convention
shortcomings in China's new laws. Ia
113. Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 308. Endeshaw observes that when a less-developed country
enacts "borrowed legislation" that is ill-suited to its current industrial development status, there is little
incentive to "work earnestly towards implementation" of the new laws. Id.
Marxism, Maoism, and Confucianism." 4 The BSA, however, is capitalistic to
the point of jingoism. For example, the BSA urges in an online Special Focus
report, "Let American ingenuity and creativity thrive. Deregulation, competi-
tion and entrepreneurship will foster our success. Regulation, government
interference and managed competition will dash prospects and stunt pro-
gress."' 5  These two sets of values stand in direct conflict. In a historical
perspective, individual intellectual property ownership is a new concept for
China," 6 and China's expressed willingness to change its law does not
necessarily evince a cultural shift." 7
If NGOs intend to help China with its legislative drafting, they will have
to convince the Chinese government that the values embodied in TRIPS are
appropriate for China's government and people. Despite the valid policy
question of whether leading economic powers should impose their legal and
social values upon other countries," 8 the fact remains that the WTO's present
standards are not compatible with China's social values. China's ongoing
failure to enforce its existing copyright laws with respect to United States
software developers gives rise to a sneaking suspicion that China has adopted
a "say anything" policy in the last two decades. If China is cheerfully re-
drafting its laws to secure desirable trade relationships but has no true interest
in enforcing them; the best NGO efforts in the legislative drafting arena will be
irrelevant to TRIPS-mandated outcomes.
B. Promulgating Laws
Once China drafts adequate laws, they must be promulgated, and the
people affected must be educated about their benefits. This is where NGOs will
shine. The BSA already has excellent channels for Internet information
dissemination. Via the Internet, the BSA promotes its software piracy reporting
114. See generally Jenckes, supra note 17, at 552-55 (providing a concise overview of historical
developments in Chinese legal ideology).
115. Business Software Affiance, The Information Marketplace: The Perspective of the Software
and Computer Industry, at http://www.bsa.org/statisticslsummary_c.html (last modified 1998).
116. Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property Enforcement
in the People's Republic of China, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10-11 (1997).
117. The sociological impact of China's new trade policies is well beyond the scope of this
Comment, but sources observe that these new international economic relationships will drive massive political
reforms in China. See, e.g., Jason Kindopp, Trade with China Promotes Political Reform - Period, CHINA
ONUN, athttp://www.chinaonline.rom/commentary-analysis/wtocm/currentews/securcOOO7244.asp
(last modified July 26, 2000). The USTR agrees, observing that "[bly encouraging structural reform and the
rule of law, [China's] accession to the WTO will... support China's own domestic reform process." 2000
NATIONAL. TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 41.
118. The WTO's intellectual property protection standards have been criticized for reflecting the
values and enforcement capabilities of nations, primarily the United States, with mature technology
industries. For a detailed analysis, see Endeshaw, supra note 27, at 304-05.
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hotlines, provides real-time piracy reporting forms, posts model policies for
corporations, and offers reports and educational materials for end users. These
BSA educational tools are already in place in the United States and should not
be difficult to implement in China. The BSA merely needs to create Internet
sites for Chinese use and translate and customize its information for the local
market. Although Internet-based initiatives rely on technological infrastructure,
China is gradually improving its Internet access capabilities. For example, this
summer the United States hardware giant Intel announced a co-operative effort
with a major China telecom company to provide Internet hosting in south
China." 9
End-user education programs are not difficult to design or implement, but
they will be challenged by the cultural gap discussed above. If consumers
believe there is nothing really wrong with using pirated software, they are
unlikely to curtail or report software piracy. For example, in response to a 1998
industry study, only 50% of Chinese software-related businesses responded that
they believed software piracy "hampers the healthy development of [the]
software industry."" 0 In the same study, 51% of the responding businesses
reported that they take no action to identify or control piracy by competitors or
counterfeiting organizations." If the concern over piracy is so low within the
software industry itself, it is reasonable to infer that non-software companies
in China, potential end-users of pirated business software, are similarly
apathetic. This does not bode well for NGO educational efforts.
Again, NGOs face the task of changing China's cultural norms before they
can implement a meaningful end-user anti-piracy education plan. Within the
software industry, NGOs might have some success. Of the Chinese companies
surveyed in 1998 that responded to a question about whether consumer
education could help reduce piracy, 25% believed that it would. 2 Although
this number is rather low, it indicates that China's software industry, at least,
is aware of potential benefits from end-user education. The NGOs' best
strategy in China would be an educational program to convince Chinese
corporate end-users, both inside and outside the software industry, that they
must actively protect intellectual property to attract and maintain transnational
trade.
119. Press Release, Intel Corporation, Intel Announces Internet Exchange Tm Architecture
Development Center in People's Republic of China (July 26, 2000) (on file with author).
120. CON'rRIBUTOiN OFTHE SOFrWARE INDUSTRYTO THE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 5. at 25
(presenting chart, "Software Piracy Impedes Market Development and Reduces Benefits").
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 39.
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C. Promoting Legal Action
Even good laws and an educated populace do not ensure that the laws will
be applied. Sixty-six percent of Chinese software companies responding to a
1998 BSA-sponsored survey agreed that "limited risk for high profitability" is
the primary reason that software is pirated in China.' Provided this is true,
increasing piracy's risk or lowering its profitability should reduce the rate of
software piracy in China.
NGOs could do in China what they have done in other countries: bring
suit on behalf of interested software developers. The BSA's 1998 study of
China's software industry speculates that Chinese software companies believe
that current legal penalties do not deter piracy, and that legal action is too
difficult or expensive to pursue. 24 NGOs and their members do not necessarily
share this doubt and could lead by example in China, filing suit in Chinese
courts for copyright infringement with respect to NGO members. The BSA has
the financial resources to undertake high-profile litigation because its United
States activities help finance transnational software anti-piracy efforts.'25
If NGOs pepper China's courts with United States copyright infringement
suits, they will probably improve Chinese pirates' awareness of piracy risk."
Securing fines and damages on behalf of NGO member companies will also
lower pirates' profitability. However, these actions will also raise the question
of whether NGOs are truly interested in helping China enforce its software anti-
piracy laws and thereby comply with TRIPS, or merely interested in protecting
NGO members' interests. Even in the United States, the BSA and its founding
member Microsoft have been criticized for being too quick to act against
alleged infringers. 2 ' Further, the BSA has garnered criticism in its own country
for being a mouthpiece for its member Microsoft Corporation's policy
decisions. "
Thus, NGOs have a difficult balancing test in China: they must support
NGO -members' interests while maintaining the image of a helping-hand
organization. This might be difficult. In 1999, a United States company's
piracy case against a Chinese corporation was dismissed; a report from the IUPA
123. Id. at 36 (presenting chart, "Reasons for Production and Sale of Pirated Software").
124. Id. at 26.
125. Oliphant, supra note 95.
126. Of course, this assertion presumes that Chinese media report and disseminate the litigation
outcomes.
127. Oliphant, supra note 95.
128. See generally T. R. Goldman, How Microsoft Gets Its Way in Washington, N.J.L.J., Nov. 4,
1996, at 4 (discussing Microsoft Corporation's lobbying activities and its prominent position in the BSA).
Cf. Robert W. Holleyman 11, Letters: Group Acts by Industry Consensus, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996,
(asserting in a letter to the editor that the BSA acts only by consensus, not in response to the influence of
certain members).
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implies the dismissal was due to "antiforeign sentiments" in the Chinese court
system. 29 NGOs would have to conduct careful public relations campaigns to
effectively raise piracy risk awareness. As discussed below, such an effort
could require governmental cooperation that China is not ready to provide.
D. Securing Government Cooperation
NGOs can provide critical market information to China's government. As
discussed above, the EPA and the BSA both have experience conducting
industry surveys, creating reports and recommendations for legislators,
testifying before domestic and international policymakers, and assessing
software anti-piracy enforcement efforts.
However, NGOs cannot act in a vacuum. They need Chinese government
cooperation and reliable sources for industry information, and at present both
appear limited. The BSA has reported success in reducing software piracy rates
in other Asian countries because "[Korean and Taiwanese] governments took
the problem seriously and acted." 30 In China, however, the IIPA reports
difficulty getting information from government sources about whether China's
commitments to enforcement are working. 13' Some evidence indicates China
does not even want enforcement help; for example, the IPA reported in 1998
that local Chinese law enforcement agencies turned down an offer of donated
computer hardware (designated for law enforcement activity) without any
explanation.13 1
The BSA's studies rely on information provided by the CCID-MIC, the
"R&D arm" of the China's Ministry of Industrial Information. 3  This is
government-disseminated information, not market information. Market
information is difficult to obtain. For example, the IIPA's 1999 Special 301
report notes that information about China's CD factories, requested by foreign
market researchers, was withheld with the claim that those data were "national
confidential documents."'' A 1999 report from the United States Department
of State summarizes another problem:
129. INTERNATIONAL INTEI.zcrUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 33.
130. Roberts. Greenburger, Software Theft Etends Well Beyond China, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,1996,
at Al.
131. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 26.
132. China, supra note 101.
133. CONTRIBUTON OF THE SoFrWARE INDUSTRY TO TIE CHINESE ECONOMY, supra note 5, at 42-
43.
134. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECruAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 2000 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note
16, at 32.
[Chinese regulations] require all foreign companies conducting
market surveys in China to go through an annual registration process
... [they] stipulate that all survey activities undertaken by foreign
institutions, or domestic agencies employed by foreigners, must first
be approved... Finished survey results must also be cleared with the
approving agency. The regulations... will be expensive and time
consuming to comply with... [and] have the potential to limit the
freedom of legitimate firms to conduct market research. In addition,
the potential for compromise of confidential business information is
substantial. 35
NGOs might not have direct influence over Chinese government offices,
but they can continue work with WIPO and the Council for TRIPS to effect
enforcement through trade pressure. NGO representatives can also work on a
personal, local level to provide knowledge, experience, and advice to the
Chinese agencies responsible for investigating piracy allegations.
E Encouraging Industry Participation
China's business community seems willing to cooperate with NGOs. A
1998 press release from the BSA was optimistic about the cooperative efforts
between the BSA's survey designer and private industry in China.'36 Private
industry could do much to further NGO educational efforts. Chinese companies
could commit to eschewing pirated software in their own businesses, dissemi-
nate information about piracy and its risks in the workplace; create and enforce
corporate policies against software piracy, and conduct self-audits to be sure
that the software they are using is legal.
Unfortunately, these glowing proposals could be premature when over half
of China's surveyed software companies have reported that the primary reason
software is pirated in China is because consumers do not have the income to
purchase legal software.'37 If legal software is simply not available, it is not
realistic to expect Chinese companies to abandon any pirated software they are
profitably using. Nor is it realistic to believe those companies will invite NGOs
to enter their offices and conduct software licensing audits. NGOs will have to
either offer these companies licensing amnesty or increase the companies'
access to legal software that performs like the pirated software.
135. 1999 CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at Section 6.
136. Press Release, Business Software Alliance, New Study: Contributions of Software Industry to
Chinese Economy BSA is Committed to Working with All Relevant Parties in China to Combat Piracy (Dec.
8, 1998) (on file with author).
137. CONTRIBUTON OF THE SoFrwARE INDUSTRYTO THE CHWNSE ECONOMY, supra note 5, at 28.
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IX. CONCLUSION
China's existing problems with software anti-piracy enforcement will
probably not keep China out of the WTO. China is already attempting to
conform to a Schedule of Specific Commitments in keeping with its participa-
tion in the GATT. 138 Although the IHPA reports some ongoing problems with
China's legislative drafting, 139 TRIPS itself does not pose a major barrier to
China's accession. Despite EPA's report to the contrary, 14° at least one




If China accedes to WTO membership, its challenge will be improving its
intellectual property rights enforcement, then maintaining that enforcement at
the "actual deterrent" level required by TRIPS. If China fails to do so, it could
be the subject of irade sanctions with respect to other WTO members.
NGOs can help China draft its laws and promulgate them. They can
promote China's existing legal system and legal remedies, advise Chinese
policymakers and government agencies, and work with private industry to
ensure a commitment to preventing end-user software piracy. Although NGOs
cannot fix all of China's enforcement woes, they certainly can help.
However, NGOs must do more than provide publicity or fill a law
enforcement gap. They must fill a cultural gap as well. To do their jobs
effectively, NGOs need cooperative commitments from the Chinese govern-
ment. They also need cooperative commitments from China's business
software end-users and the Chinese software industry. China has sought little
hands-on law enforcement help from its international neighbors, and it does not
seem to be doing so now. If China joins the WTO, only time will tell whether
Chinese policymakers' desire for transnational software trade is strong enough
for them to embrace TRIPS's value system and welcome NGO participation in
its fight against software piracy.
138. See WTO Agreement, supra note 33, at 1150-51.
139. People's Republic of China, supra note 54.
140. Id
141. Cheng, supra note 25, at 2006.
